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Abstract	What	 does	 it	mean	 to	 be	 responsible	 in	 and	 for	 the	Arctic?	 This	 article	
addresses	this	question,	noting	that	responsibility	has	become	a	core	policy	norm	in	
different	governance	areas	in	recent	decades.	The	article	contributes	to	the	recent	
debate	on	responsibility	in	global	politics,	arguing	that	one	should	consider	not	only	
who	 is	 responsible	 and	what	 for,	 but	 also	 the	 capability	 foundations	 upon	which	
responsibility	 is	 exercised,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 underlying	 normativity	 of	 this	 practice.	
Instead	 of	 focusing	 on	 capabilities	 as	 first	 principles	 from	 which	 responsibilities	
arise,	this	article	suggests	approaching	responsibility	as	a	web	of	relations.	On	the	
basis	 of	 this	 theoretical	discussion	 the	article	 turns	 to	 two	 cases	of	 contemporary	
Arctic	policy	where	we	can	observe	responsibility	‘at	work’.	The	fields	of	search	and	
rescue	 and	 sustainable	 development	 are	 both	marked	 by	 a	 cooperative	 approach	
among	 (state	 and	 non-state)	 parties,	 whose	 interactions	 centre	 on	 a	 particular	
ethical	understanding	of	responsibility	rather	than	on	power-oriented	politics.	Yet	
each	policy	 field	contains	specific	dilemmas,	as	Arctic	governance	 is	characterised	
by	a	web	of	responsibility	that	comprises	multiple	subjects	in	charge	and/or	objects	
for	which	they	are	responsible.	
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Introduction	
What	 are	 the	 implications	 of	 institutionalising	 responsibility	 as	 a	 central	 element	 of	
governance?	 This	 article	 argues	 that	 responsibility	 has	 become	 a	 core	 normative	
element	of	global	politics,	albeit	one	that	gives	rise	to	complex	configurations	of	actors	
and	the	objects	for	which	they	are	or	are	not	responsible.	In	raising	the	issue	of	what	it	
means	to	be	responsible	 in	and	for	the	Arctic,	 the	argument	put	forward	in	this	article	
highlights	 the	 ambiguous	 nature	 of	 responsibility	 as	 a	 normative	 element	 of	 global	
governance.	 It	makes	 its	 case	with	special	 reference	 to	 the	 fields	of	 search	and	rescue	
and	sustainable	development.	Insights	from	how	responsibility	is	institutionalised	in	the	
Arctic	 context	may	 also	 ultimately	 hold	 implications	 for	 how	we	 view	 global	 politics.	
Generally	speaking,	responsibility	has	developed	into	a	core	normative	concept	of	global	
politics	 that	 is	 continuously	 shaping	 relations	 between	 actors	 and	 the	 objects	 for	 or	
towards	which	they	are	assigned	or	take	responsibility.	This	constellation	of	relations	is	
sustained	on	 the	basis	of	existing,	assumed	or	claimed	capacities,	which	 in	 turn	raises	
fundamental	questions	about	the	normative	quality	of	these	links.	
	 2	
This	 article	 aims	 to	 contribute	 to	 recent	 theoretical	 debate	 among	 scholars	 of	
International	Relations,	which	has	highlighted	questions	about	who	 is	responsible	and	
what	 for.	 The	 article	 critiques	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 most	 encompassing	 treatment	 of	
responsibility	has	resulted	in	a	search	for,	or	reification	of,	‘first	principles’.	This	search	
takes	place	in	two	forms,	although	they	can	overlap.	First,	there	are	attempts	to	clearly	
define	 conditions	 under	 which	 particular	 actors,	 usually	 powerful	 states,	 assume	
leadership	roles	in	global	politics.	Authors	in	this	field	take	state	capacities	as	given,	and	
highlight	the	special	role	of	states	to	take	on	responsibility	for	particular	areas	of	global	
politics,	such	as	peace-keeping	or	tackling	climate	change.	A	second	kind	of	engagement	
with	first	principles	focuses	on	legal	obligations	in	terms	of	accountability.	 In	contrast,	
this	 article	 draws	 on	 some	 of	 the	 related	 writings	 on	 responsibility	 in	 international	
political	 theory	 and	 legal	 philosophy	 to	 emphasise	 the	 usefulness	 of	 context-sensitive	
enquiries.	 It	 argues	 that	 capacities	 may	 matter,	 but	 they	 do	 so	 only	 within	 social	
contexts	and	practices.	Responsibility	cannot	be	determined	in	terms	of	first	principles,	
but	 rather	 through	 the	web	 of	 relations	 through	which	 it	 comes	 to	 life,	 including	 the	
normative	quality	of	the	connection	between	subject	and	object	of	responsibility.		
It	 is	 possible	 to	 observe	 an	 increase	 in	 references	 to	 responsibility	 across	diverse	
governance	 areas	 (Hansen-Magnusson	 and	 Vetterlein	 2018;	 Hansen-Magnusson,	
Vetterlein	 et	 al.	 2018),	 such	 as	 economics,	 security	 or	 the	 environment,	 in	 which	
responsibility	has	become	a	central	policy	norm:1	corporate	social	responsibility	(CSR)	
shapes	 the	 way	 in	 which	 corporations	 interact	 with	 their	 surroundings,	 including	 a	
concern	for	the	environment	as	well	as	human	rights	(Dashwood	2014;	Karp	2014);	the	
responsibility	 to	 protect	 (R2P)	 has	 triggered	 a	much-discussed	 re-calibration	 of	 state	
sovereignty	 in	 favour	 of	 strengthened	 relations	 between	 the	 international	 community	
and	citizens	 (Wheeler	2006;	Bellamy	2011;	Hehir	2011;	Glanville	2014);	and	common	
but	 differentiated	 responsibility	 (CBDR)	 has	 played	 a	 key	 role	 in	 climate	 governance	
negotiations	subsequent	to	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	as	it	assigns	states	responsibility	for	the	
sustainable	use	of	natural	resources	(Brunnée	and	Toope	2010).	
These	developments	were	made	possible	over	the	past	two	decades	in	the	wake	of	
the	 so-called	 Brundtland	 Report	 (United	 Nations	World	 Commission	 on	 Environment	
and	Development	1987).	This	achieved	the	integration	of	economics	and	environmental	
																																																								
1	Susan	Park	and	Antje	Vetterlein	define	policy	norms	“as	shared	expectations	for	all	relevant	actors	
within	a	community	about	what	constitutes	appropriate	behaviour,	which	is	encapsulated	in	[…]	policy”	
(Park	and	Vetterlein	2010,	4).	
	 3	
concerns	 under	 the	 concept	 of	 sustainable	 development,	 which	 had	 been	 attempted	
since	the	1972	Stockholm	Conference	where	the	rights	of	the	individual	were	specified,	
such	as	 the	 rights	 to	adequate	 food,	housing,	 safe	water	 and	 family	planning.	On	page	
five	the	Report	shifted	the	responsibility	of	policy	efforts	to	the	global	collective:	
 
We live in an era in the history of nations when there is greater need than ever for co-ordinated political 
action and responsibility. The United Nations and its Secretary-General are faced with an enormous task 
and burden. Responsibly meeting humanity’s goals and aspirations will require the active support of us 
all. 
	
The	 Brundtland	 Report	 also	 provided	 a	 methodology	 to	 broaden	 and	 rethink	 the	
concept	 of	 security	 (Glanville	 2014),	 a	 conundrum	 which	 had	 been	 tackled	 by	 Willy	
Brandt	 and	 Olof	 Palme	 in	 different	 UN	 reports	 in	 the	 1980s,	 as	 well	 as	 by	 Boutros	
Boutros-Ghali	 in	 1992	 and	 Gareth	 Evans	 in	 1993.	 Following	 the	 Brundtland	 Report’s	
example,	sovereignty	was	recast	in	terms	of	responsibility	for	the	individual	rather	than	
state	rights:		
	
The	starting	point	is	that	any	state	has	the	primary	responsibility	to	protect	the	individuals	within	
it.	But	that	is	not	the	finishing	point:	where	the	state	is	unable	or	unwilling	to	meet	its	own	
responsibility,	through	either	incapacity	or	ill	will,	a	secondary	responsibility	to	protect	falls	on	the	
wider	international	community	to	step	in,	by	whatever	means	is	appropriate	to	the	particular	
situation.	(Evans	2008,	42)	
	
Noting	 this	 empirical	 richness,	 theory	 is	 not	 far	 away	 in	 attempts	 at	 conceptual	
clarification	and	discussion.	In	an	attempt	to	provide	a	holistic	account	of	responsibility,	
this	article	addresses	the	complex	yet	compartmentalised	approach	to	responsibility	in	
theoretical	discussions.	The	debate	revolves	around	questions	of	whether	collectives	can	
and	 should	 hold	 responsibility	 (Erskine	 2003),	 where	 the	 dividing	 line	 runs	 between	
individual	and	collective	responsibility	(Arendt	1958;	Held	1970;	French	1972),	why	it	
might	be	fruitful	to	distinguish	different	types	of	responsibility,	such	as	legal,	moral	and	
political	(Ainley	2011;	Beardsworth	2015),	or	the	practices	through	which	responsibility	
becomes	 attributed	 to	 any	 actor	 in	 the	 first	 place	 (Lang	 Jr	 1999;	 Frost	 2004;	 Hoover	
2012).	The	article	argues	 that	we	can	 take	 lessons	 from	 these	debates,	with	a	view	 to	
addressing	 issues	 that	will	 elude	 those	who	search	 for	 first	principles.	On	 the	basis	of	
this	discussion,	the	article	offers	a	framework	that	discusses	the	subjects	and	objects	of	
responsibility,	the	different	forms	of	capacity	that	are	embedded	in	social	relations,	and	
the	 normative	 context	 of	 these	 relations.	 It	 then	 demonstrates	 the	 usefulness	 of	 this	
holistic	approach	through	an	analysis	of	contemporary	Arctic	governance.		
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The	Arctic	appears	to	be	a	prime	case	to	focus	on.	The	impacts	of	climate	change	are	
gradually	 becoming	 visible	 in	 the	 reducing	 ice	 coverage	 of	 the	 Arctic	 Ocean,	 which	
makes	the	region	a	prime	example	of	Hans	Jonas’	argument	that	the	changed	temporal	
and	spatial	impact	of	human	activity	deriving	from	technological	developments	since	the	
nineteenth	century	makes	it	imperative	to	take	responsibility	to	positively	influence	the	
course	of	human	development	(Jonas	1984).	While	it	will	remain	difficult	to	navigate	the	
Arctic	for	decades	to	come,	increased	human	activity	has	been	one	of	the	results	of	these	
changing	environmental	conditions.	There	is	a	burgeoning	literature	that	makes	various	
assertions	regarding	 the	motivations	of	states	and	non-state	actors,	usually	relating	 to	
improved	 access	 to	 resources	 such	 as	 oil	 and	 gas,	 but	 also	 raising	 questions	 about	
military	as	well	as	human	security	(Hoogensen	2007;	Hønneland	2016;	Hough	2017).	
As	 the	 Arctic	 is	 no	 regio	 incognita,	 instead	 being	 home	 to	more	 than	 four	million	
inhabitants,	increased	scope	for	human	activity	raises	a	number	of	questions	about	the	
nature	of	the	interactions	taking	place,	particularly	the	kinds	of	rules	that	they	follow	or	
which	they	create	(Bloom	1999;	Koivurova	2010;	Humrich	2013;	Wilson	2016;	Knecht	
2017).	By	raising	the	question	of	what	it	means	to	be	responsible	in	and	for	the	Arctic,	
the	article	focuses	on	two	policy	areas	which	map	onto	the	broader	global	development	
of	 institutionalising	 responsibility	 that	 followed	 from	 the	 Brundtland	 Report,	 namely	
search	 and	 rescue	 and	 sustainable	 development.	 The	 focus	 on	 these	 rather	 well	
circumscribed	 areas	 of	 Arctic	 governance	 helps	 to	 illustrate	 the	 ambiguity	 that	
responsibility	may	contain	in	the	broader,	global	context.	
The	 remaining	 parts	 of	 the	 article	 are	 arranged	 as	 follows.	 The	 following	 section	
provides	a	synthesised	discussion	of	responsibility	in	global	politics.	The	section	draws	
together	different	strands	of	contemporary	debate	 to	highlight	 that	responsibility	 is	at	
the	 core	of	 contractual	 relations	 in	 global	politics,	which	yield	 ethical,	 legal	 as	well	 as	
political	 concerns.	 The	 section	 underscores	 the	 need	 to	 look	 into	 the	 capacities	 upon	
which	 responsibility	 is	 enacted	 as	well	 as	 the	 normativity	 underpinning	 this	 practice.	
Who	is	responsible	and	what	for	are	not	issues	that	can	be	resolved	in	a	straightforward	
manner.	Rather,	a	multitude	of	potential	subjects	of	responsibility,	as	well	as	a	multitude	
of	potential	objects,	force	us	to	think	about	the	political	implications	of	institutionalising	
responsibility	in	global	governance.	
Based	 on	 this	 theoretical	 groundwork,	 the	 article	 then	 turns	 to	 discuss	
responsibility	in	the	context	of	the	Arctic.	It	 looks	at	the	way	in	which	responsibility	is	
anchored	 in	 search	 and	 rescue	 agreements	 as	 well	 as	 approaches	 to	 sustainable	
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development,	 highlighting	 both	 promising	 developments	 as	 well	 as	 the	 difficulties	
arising	from	the	web	of	responsibility	that	has	been	spun	in	Arctic	governance	in	recent	
years.	
	
	
(International)	Relations	of	Responsibility	
Responsibility	 is	 a	 relational	 concept,	which	normatively	 links	 actors	 and	objects.	The	
Latin	verb	“spondere”,	from	which	the	noun	responsibility	ultimately	derives,	connotes	
both	“to	promise”	and	“to	pledge”,	as	well	as	“contract	to	give/take	 in	marriage”.2	This	
contractual	 understanding	 of	 a	 relation	 is	 echoed	 in	 civil	 law,	where	 responsibility	 is	
always	 to	 someone	and	 for	 something	 (Cane	2002,	 50).	Responsibility	 therefore	 gives	
rise	to	contractual	relations	of	which	we	can	ask,	first,	“who	is	responsible?”,	which	we	
will	 refer	 to	 as	 the	 subject	 of	 responsibility,	 and	 second,	 “what	 object	 are	 they	
responsible	for?”,	which	denotes	the	object	of	responsibility.		
A	 number	 of	 International	 Relations	 scholars,	 who	 have	 undertaken	 the	 most	
encompassing	contributions	 to	 this	 field,	have	been	attempting	 to	clarify	 the	nature	of	
this	contractual	relationship	by	highlighting	at	least	one	of	two	aspects	from	which	they	
seek	 to	conclude	some	kind	of	 first	principle.	Both	aspects	 can	be	defined	as	 capacity,	
consisting	of	either	material	resources	or	legal	arrangements	on	the	basis	of	which	the	
relations	between	subject	and	object	of	responsibility	take	shape.	I	discuss	these	types	
of	capacity	 in	 turn,	before	arguing	 that	responsibility	eludes	determinacy	because	 it	 is	
entangled	in	a	web	of	relations.		
The	 material	 capacity	 of	 states	 plays	 a	 key	 role	 in	 accounts	 from	 a	 range	 of	
International	Relations	scholarship.	In	the	Realist	take	on	responsibility,	the	state	makes	
constant	efforts	to	build	its	capacity	for	survival	because	“a	nation’s	survival	 is	 its	first	
and	foremost	responsibility;	it	cannot	be	compromised	or	put	to	risk”	(Kissinger	1977).	
On	this	basis,	authors	such	as	Kenneth	Waltz	have	made	a	case	 for	US	exceptionalism,	
arguing	that	“those	of	greatest	capability	take	on	special	responsibilities”	(Waltz	1979,	
198),	through	which	he	justifies	the	US	role	in	seeking	a	stable	global	order	during	the	
1970s.	More	recently,	liberal-constructivist	research	has	further	discussed	the	notion	of	
special	 responsibilities	 as	 a	 hierarchical	 element	 of	 global	 politics,	 based	 on	material	
power	 (Bukovansky,	 Clark	 et	 al.	 2012,	 7).	 These	 authors	 argue	 that	 special	
responsibilities	 bestow	 legitimacy	 on	 the	 status	 quo	 of	 global	 order	 because	 it	
																																																								
2	Compare:	http://latin-dictionary.net/definition/35550/spondeo-spondere-spopondi-sponsus	(accessed	
September	1,	2017).	
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represents	 a	 compromise	 between	 the	 formally	 equal	 responsibilities	 of	 states	 under	
international	 law	on	 the	one	hand,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 states	are	equally	answerable	 for	
legal	commitments	and	obligations,	and,	on	the	other	hand,	the	observation	that	states	
are	differentiated	in	terms	of	material	capacity	(ibid.,	8).	While	they	make	the	case	with	
regard	 to	 the	 United	 States,	 their	 work	 is	 characteristic	 of	 a	 wider	 range	 of	 English	
School-related	 approaches	 that	 share	 in	 common	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 role	 of	 capacity	 for	
taking	 on	 exceptional	 duties	 in	 global	 politics	 (Wight	 1978).	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	
“great	powers”	bear	special	responsibilities	for	global	order	by	virtue	of	a	mutual	bond	
with	weaker	states.	Hedley	Bull	writes,	
	
Great	powers	(…)	assert	the	right,	and	are	accorded	the	right,	to	play	a	part	in	determining	issues	
that	affect	the	peace	and	security	of	the	international	system	as	a	whole.	They	accept	the	duty,	and	
are	thought	by	others	to	have	the	duty,	of	modifying	their	policies	in	the	light	of	the	managerial	
responsibilities	they	bear.	(Bull	2002	(1977),	196)	
	
This	 view	 is	 supported	 by	 work	 in	 the	 field	 of	 International	 Political	 Theory.	 For	
example,	 Toni	 Erskine	 has	 repeatedly	 made	 the	 case	 that	 states	 possess	 moral	
responsibility	to	remedy	crises	when	conventional	mechanisms	for	decision	making	fail.	
She	 draws	 on	 debates	 on	 individual	 versus	 collective	 responsibility	 in	 philosophy	
(French	1972)	to	make	the	case	for	so-termed	coalitions	of	the	willing	to	form	in	times	
of	 crisis	 and	 impasse	 in	 the	 United	 Nations	 Security	 Council	 (Erskine	 2004;	 Erskine	
2008;	Erskine	2014).	The	argument	holds	 that	 those	states	who	can	exert	what	David	
Miller	has	termed	remedial	capacity	(Miller	2001)	are	morally	compelled	to	find	ways	of	
coordinating	their	actions	to	relieve	human	suffering.	
A	different	notion	of	capacity	is	derived	from	formal	or	legal	resources.	Scholarship	
in	 this	 field	 engages	 with	 formalised	 relations	 between	 actors,	 usually	 states,	 to	
determine	accountability	 as	 the	 core	 feature	 of	 responsibility	 relations.	 In	 the	 field	 of	
regulatory	 governance,	 for	 instance,	 scholars	 are	 interested	 in	 defining	 who	 is	
responsible	 across	 a	 number	 of	 different	 levels,	 from	 policy-making	 all	 the	 way	 to	
implementation	 (Bianculli,	 Fernàndez-i-Marín	 et	 al.	 2015).	 Others	 seek	 to	 remedy	
accountability	gaps	in	global	politics	by	forming	new	institutions	or	widening	the	remit	
of	existing	ones.	In	this	vein,	it	has	been	suggested	that	the	International	Criminal	Court	
may	 try	 not	 just	 violent	 but	 also	 nonviolent	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 (Aloyo	 2013).	
Overall,	 the	accountability	deficit	 in	global	politics	has	been	discussed	repeatedly	over	
the	past	decade	(Slaughter	2004;	Grant	and	Keohane	2005;	Bovens	2007;	McCorquodale	
2013;	 Zürn	 2018).	 In	 its	 search	 for	 a	 first	 principle	 regarding	 who	 is	 actually	
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responsible,	 this	 literature	addresses	both	positive	and	negative	responsibilities	–	 that	
is,	engaging	in	actions	that	would	prevent	or	stop	causing	harm	(Karp	2014;	Wettstein	
2015)	–	but	the	majority	of	research	deals	with	remedial	responsibility	(Miller	2001)	for	
events	 or	 actions	 that	 occurred	 in	 the	 past,	 especially	 who	 should	 correct	 particular	
wrongs	if	they	were	brought	about	through	either	action	or	inaction.	
Both	accounts	of	capacity	share	in	common	that	their	object	of	study	provides	them	
with	a	first	principle	from	which	to	make	inferences	about	the	nature	of	the	contractual	
relation	between	subject	and	object	of	 responsibility.	As	 I	 argue	below,	however,	 they	
both	insufficiently	acknowledge	that	responsibility	is	embedded	in	a	web	of	socio-legal	
normativity	that	complicates	these	contractual	relations	significantly,	because	it	means	
that	responsibility	 is	not	simply	given	by	virtue	of	resources	but	rather	constructed	 in	
social	processes.	Instead	of	confining	ourselves	to	discussing	the	role	of	particular	forms	
of	 capacity,	 scholarship	 should	engage	with	 the	multiple	 relations	of	which	 they	are	a	
part	and	the	social	configurations	(Jackson	2006)	to	which	they	give	rise.	
I	 contend	 that	 responsibility	 is	 part	 of	 a	 web	 of	 relations	 that	 enables	 particular	
forms	 of	 politics	 through	 processes	 of	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion	 as	 well	 as	 by	 creating	
uncertainties	 and	 ambiguities.	 Rather	 than	 seeking	 first	 principles,	 we	 should	 accept	
indeterminacy	and	engage	with	a	more	hermeneutic	project	of	analysing	the	work	that	
responsibility	does	for	global	politics.	A	basic	outline	of	such	a	web	of	responsibility	is	
sketched	in	Figure	1	(below).	
	
(Figure	1)	
	
Normativity	and	the	Web	of	Responsibility	
Legal	philosophers	have	emphasised	 the	 complexity	of	 the	 subject-question	 through	a	
discussion	of	what	can	be	termed	causal	or	outcome	responsibility	(Honoré	1999;	Miller	
2007).	Specifically,	 they	 link	responsibility	to	procedure	and	substance	by	highlighting	
that	 the	 issue	 of	 capacity	 is	 more	 than	 material	 capability	 or	 legal	 provision.	
International	Relations	scholars	would	be	well	advised	to	pay	close	attention	to	Miller	
and	Honoré’s	arguments,	which	show	how	the	material	and	legal	aspects	of	capacity	are	
socially	interlinked	dimensions.		
This	may	be	demonstrated	through	a	discussion	of	HLA	Hart’s	famous	example	of	a	
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drunken	captain	who	caused	his	boat	 to	 sink.3	Thus,	while	 substantive	capacity	or	 the	
material	 endowment	 through	 which	 an	 actor	 can	 take	 responsibility	 for	 something	
surely	matters,	Miller	and	Honoré	remind	us	that	roles	such	as	that	of	captain	are	also	
linked	to	ideational	capacity.	This	second	notion	of	capacity	may	refer	to	a	legal	position	
that	 is	 embedded	 in	 a	web	 of	 normative	 expectations.	 Being	 a	 captain	 requires	more	
than	knowledge	of	navigation	–	the	material	component	–	it	also	involves	a	duty	of	care	
for	 boat	 and	 passengers.	 Capacity	 may	 also	 be	 a	 mixture	 of	 the	 two	 –	 for	 instance,	
regarding	social	expectations	of	what	can	be	reasonably	expected	from	an	actor.	Thus,	
not	 only	 does	 an	 actor	 require	 the	 physical	 means	 to	 cause	 an	 event	 in	 order	 to	 be	
responsible	 for	 it	 –	 which	 resembles	 the	 debate	 about	 agency	 among	 sociologists	
(Campbell	2009);	judgement	about	the	way	in	which	the	event	came	about	is	also	linked	
to	societal	expectations	of	what	was	reasonable	conduct,	especially	 if	some	alternative	
event	 was	 not	 brought	 about.4	In	 this	 regard,	 the	 law	 often	 makes	 exceptions	 for	
children	 or	 deeds	 committed	 under	 great	 emotional	 strain.	 This	 latter	 example	 is	
arbitrary,	though,	as	made	plain	by	Honoré	when	he	writes	that	“being	responsible	and	
being	legally	liable	are	partly	a	matter	of	luck”	(Honoré	1999,	1).	
It	 has	 recently	 been	 argued	 that	 “responsibility	 is	 more	 than	 accountability”	
(Vetterlein	2018),	especially	because	not	all	regulations	prescribe	behaviour	in	minute	
detail.	 Rather,	 responsibility	 includes	 a	 moral	 dimension	 in	 which	 future	 conduct	
becomes	 the	subject	of	negotiation.	With	regard	 to	material	 capabilities,	 the	argument	
has	been	made	that	domestic	politics	matter	in	determining	how	the	capabilities	will	be	
put	 to	 use	 (Loke	 2016).	 It	 is	 therefore	 not	 a	 given	 that	 capacity	 alone	 adequately	
indicates	how	responsibility	will	be	enacted	(Hoover	2012).	In	short,	what	matters	are	
the	 social	 processes	 through	which	 responsibility	 comes	 to	 life,	which	 encompass	 the	
politics	 of	 excluding	 those	 who	 might	 not	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 join	 a	 coalition,	 even	
though	 they	 might	 be	 willing,	 and	 related	 questions	 of	 who	 is	 not	 included	 in	 the	
																																																								
3	In	what	is	probably	the	most	widely-cited	example	in	the	literature,	Hart	presents	a	neat	but	
oversimplified	account	of	responsibility	types:	“As captain of the ship, X was responsible for the safety of his 
passengers and crew. But on his last voyage he got drunk every night and was responsible for the loss of the ship 
with all aboard. It was rumoured that he was insane, but the doctors considered that he was responsible for his 
actions. Throughout the voyage he behaved quite irresponsibly, and various incidents in his career showed that 
he was not a responsible person. He always maintained that the exceptional winter storms were responsible for 
the loss of the ship, but in the legal proceedings brought against him he was found criminally responsible for his 
negligent conduct, and in separate civil proceedings he was held legally responsible for the loss of life and 
property. He is still alive and he is morally responsible for the deaths of many women and children” (Hart and 
Gardner 2008, 211).	
4	The	example	is	that	of	a	parent	that	does	not	look	after	playing	children	with	due	attention	and	therefore	
is	responsible	for	an	accident,	even	though	they	did	not	directly	cause	it	themselves.	
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contractual	relations.	
Concerning	 the	 object	 of	 responsibility,	 contractual	 relations	 are	 also	 more	
complicated	 than	 International	 Relations	 scholars	 conventionally	 assume.	 While	
Bukovansky,	Clark	et	al.	(2012)	examine	special	responsibilities	with	regard	to	climate	
change,	 nuclear	 politics	 and	 finance,	 recent	 work	 on	 businesses’	 corporate	 social	
responsibility	 and	 human	 rights	 questions	 whether	 the	 subject	 and	 object	 of	
responsibility	are	not	linked	in	more	complex	ways.	For	instance,	the	debate	about	who	
has	remedial	responsibility	for	human	rights	pitches	cosmopolitan	accounts	which	hold	
that	 states	are	 in	charge	 (Pogge	2005)	against	pluralists	who	argue	 that	multinational	
corporations,	perhaps	NGOs	as	well,	possess	more	capability	to	deliver	on	human	rights	
than	 some	 states	with	weak	 governance	 infrastructure	 (O'Neill	 2005,	 46;	Karp	2014).	
Some	 scholars	have	argued	 that	 the	 formalisation	of	 corporate	 social	 responsibility	 in	
the	so-called	Ruggie	or	Guiding	Principles	(Ruggie	2011)	is	troubling	because	bestowing	
remedial	 responsibility	on	 corporations	 legitimises	 them	and	 their	 actions,	while	 they	
often	 seek	 to	 avoid	 public	 accountability	 (Thompson	 2012;	 Dashwood	 2014).	
Conventionally,	 multinational	 corporations	 have	 responsibility	 towards	 their	
shareholders	 and	 not	 the	 local	 communities	 in	 which	 they	 operate.	 Despite	 cautious	
optimism	 that	 corporations	may	 not	 necessarily	 be	 the	 profit-maximising	 beasts	 that	
they	are	sometime	portrayed	to	be,	who	is	to	say	which	object	they	prioritise?		
The	 situation	 surrounding	 multiple	 objects	 of	 responsibility	 is	 similar	 to	 that	
regarding	 states.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 development	 of	 the	 “responsibility	 to	 protect”	
puts	 the	 international	 community	 in	 charge	 of	 human	 rights	 if	 a	 state	 fails	 to	 uphold	
these	 (Welsh	 and	 Banda	 2010).	 Humanitarian	 law	 provides	 the	 normative	 context	 in	
which	a	possible	intervention	should	take	place,	emphasising	that	civilians	must	not	be	
targeted	 and	 that	 the	 means	 used	 are	 proportionate.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 states	 have	
responsibility	 towards	 their	 own	 citizens,	 including	 military	 personnel,	 which	 is	 the	
scenario	emphasised	by	(neo-)realists	(Waltz	1959).	Similar	to	the	issue	of	prioritising	
different	responsibilities	 faced	by	corporations,	 in	 this	scenario	 the	question	becomes,	
for	instance,	at	what	height	does	a	plane	fly	to	accurately	target	military	infrastructure	
and	spare	the	lives	of	civilians,	while	ensuring	the	safety	of	pilots?	
To	summarise	this	discussion,	we	can	say	that	responsibility	refers	to	social	and/or	
legal	contractual	relations	between	a	subject	and	an	object	of	responsibility.	Speaking	of	
responsibility	 or	 “responsibilising”	 an	 issue	 is	 a	normative	process:	 relations	between	
subject	 and	 object	 of	 responsibility	 are	 normatively	 underpinned	 because	
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responsibilising	attempts	to	define	what	counts	as	capacity	in	the	first	place,	as	well	as	
how	 this	 capacity	not	only	 enables	 actors	 to	 take	on	 responsibility	 for	 something,	 but	
also	 how	 holding	 capacity	might	 give	 rise	 to	 a	moral	 imperative	 to	 act.	 Capacity	 thus	
refers	to	more	than	material	or	legal	aspects;	it	entails	a	social	component	as	well.	In	its	
different	 dimensions,	 capacity	 complicates	 the	 question	 of	 who	 is	 responsible	 by	
allowing	us	to	also	raise	the	political	question	of	who	is	not	responsible	–	which	is	to	say	
that	responsibilising	an	issue	may	produce	or	reinforce	social	hierarchies,	especially	in	
the	presence	of	multiple	(potential)	subjects	and	overlapping	claims	towards	an	object.	
Similarly	regarding	the	object	of	responsibility,	a	number	of	possibilities	exist	which	are	
also	 framed	 normatively.	 Actors	 might	 be	 responsible	 for	 different	 objects	
simultaneously,	which	raises	questions	about	the	basis	on	which	decisions	are	made.		
	
Policies	of	Responsibility	in	and	for	the	Arctic	
This	 section	 takes	 a	 close	 look	 at	 the	 way	 in	 which	 responsibility	 is	 being	
institutionalised	in	the	Arctic	and	among	the	Arctic	nations.5	Cases	will	be	considered	in	
terms	of	the	subject	and	the	object	of	responsibility,	capacities	and	normativity	in	order	
to	systematically	approach	responsibility	as	a	web	of	relations.	
Initially,	analysing	the	recent	search	and	rescue	agreement,	I	will	show	that	the	state	
is	 the	 main	 actor	 in	 charge.	 It	 executes	 its	 responsibility	 based	 on	 capacity,	 which	
comprises	 two	major	elements.	The	 first	 is	 generally	 referred	 to	as	 “maritime	domain	
awareness”(MDA),6	while	the	second	comprises	specific	legal	provisions.	Both	reinforce	
each	other	as	legal	agreements	legitimise	the	building	of	infrastructure	Responsibility	is	
thereby	 institutionalised	 by	 capacity	 enhancing	 steps,	 yet	 this	 capacity	 need	 not	
exclusively	 be	 put	 to	 ‘good’	 use.	 This	 is	 because	 search	 and	 rescue	 organisations	 are	
state	 institutions	 which	 are	 responsible	 for	 ensuring	 safety	 at	 sea,	 i.e.	 benefitting	
humanity,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 enforcing	 sovereignty	 on	 the	 other.	 The	 section	
concludes	 by	 discussing	 this	 constellation	 of	 multiple	 objects	 of	 responsibility	 as	 a	
potential	dilemma.		
From	 this	 discussion	 I	 move	 on	 to	 look	 at	 sustainable	 development,	 which	 is	
enabled	 by	 the	 legacy	 of	 the	 Brundtland	 Report.	 While	 there	 are	 indicators	 which	
suggest	 that	 sustainable	 development	 holds	 emancipatory	 potential,	 we	 can	 raise	
																																																								
5	They	are	Canada,	Denmark/Greenland,	Iceland,	the	United	States	and	Russia,	as	the	so-called	Arctic-5,	
plus	Finland,	Norway	and	Sweden,	extending	the	circle	to	the	Arctic-8.	
6	MDA	can	be	defined	as	“the	effective	understanding	of	anything	associated	with	the	maritime	domain	
that	could	impact	global	security,	safety,	economic	activity,	or	the	environment”;	see	Vance	and	Vicente	
(2006).	
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questions	about	the	long-term	effects	of	Arctic	policies	in	this	context.	As	sustainability	
may	 be	 approached	 from	different	 angles,	 the	 question	 concerns	what	 happens	when	
responsible	 actors	 shift	 their	 focus.	 Following	 from	 the	 conceptual	 discussion	 in	 the	
previous	 section,	 this	 case	 demonstrates	 the	 dilemma	 to	 which	 multiple	 actors	 and	
multiple	responsibility	objectives	may	lead.	
	
Search	and	Rescue:	Subject	and	Object	
Search	and	rescue	(SAR)	institutions	at	sea	are	the	responsibility	of	states.	Arctic	states	
differ	 in	 the	 organisational	 structure	 of	 their	 SAR	 organisations.	 The	 SAR	 Agreement	
identifies	 different	 so-termed	 “competent	 authorities”	 who	 administer	 the	 respective	
SAR	agency	or	agencies	in	each	country	(SAR	Agreement	2011,	Appendix	1),	such	as	the	
Minister	of	National	Defence	 (Canada),	 the	Danish	Maritime	Authority	 (Denmark),	 the	
Ministry	of	the	Interior	and	the	Finnish	Transport	Safety	Agency	(Finland),	the	Ministry	
of	the	Interior	(Iceland),	the	Ministry	of	Justice	and	the	Police	(Norway),	the	Ministry	of	
Transport	of	 the	Russian	Federation,	as	well	as	 the	Ministry	of	 the	Russian	Federation	
for	Civil	Defence,	Emergency,	and	the	Elimination	of	Consequences	of	Natural	Disasters	
(Russia),	 the	 Swedish	Maritime	 Administration	 (Sweden)	 and	 the	 United	 States	 Coast	
Guard	(USA).	It	is	usually	the	coast	or	border	guard	that	takes	the	lead	in	executing	SAR	
operations	(SAR	Agreement	2011,	Appendix	 II),	but	 there	are	considerable	differences	
between	 the	 countries	 regarding	 the	 role	 of	 this	 organisation	 (Østhagen	 2016).	 For	
example,	 the	 United	 States	 Coast	 Guard	 represents	 one	 of	 the	 five	 branches	 of	 the	
country’s	 armed	 forces,	 not	 dissimilar	 to	 the	 role	 of	 Finnish	 or	 even	 Icelandic	 coast	
guards.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 Swedish	Maritime	 Administration	 primarily	 exists	 to	 provide	
services	 to	 (commercial)	 shipping,	 while	 the	 Swedish	 Navy	 takes	 on	 the	 role	 of	
controlling	 and	 securing	 Swedish	 borders	 (Sjöfartsverket	 n.d.).	 Yet	 despite	 this	
organisational	variation,	it	is	clear	that	SAR	competencies	rest	with	respective	states	and	
responsibility	has	not	been	fragmented	and	shared	with	non-state	parties.	
However,	 the	 object	 of	 responsibility	 in	 this	 context	 is	 two-fold	 and	 comprises	 a	
concern	for	state	sovereignty,	on	the	one	hand,	and	care	for	humanity	on	the	other.	This	
split	can	be	explained	as	an	institutional	legacy	from	the	founding	days	of	organisations.	
The	developmental	trajectory	of	the	Coast	Guard	in	Great	Britain	served	as	a	role	model	
for	 other	 countries	 and	 explains	 the	 dual	 nature	 of	 what	 states	 are	 responsible	 for.	
Aspects	 of	 security,	which	 relate	 to	 considerations	 of	 state	 sovereignty,	were	 present	
from	 the	 very	 beginning.	 In	 1809	 the	 so-called	 “Preventive	Waterguard”	was	 formed,	
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which	 would	 later	 become	 HM	 Coast	 Guard.	 Its	 primary	 purpose	 was	 to	 ensure	
sovereignty	and	security,	particularly	by	fighting	smuggling	during	the	Napoleonic	War.	
In	 those	 days	 this	 meant	 fighting	 transnational	 crime	 –	 i.e.	 preventing	 the	 endemic	
smuggling	of	brandy	into	the	UK	and	the	outflow	of	revenues	to	France.7	Organised	life-
saving	was	a	late	by-product	of	the	Coast	Guard’s	duties.		
However,	other	maritime	actors	had	begun	to	set	up	different	infrastructure	around	
the	same	time.	In	contrast	to	the	sovereignty	and	security-focused	institutionalisation	of	
the	Coast	Guard,	 this	parallel	build-up	of	 capacity	 is	 evidence	of	 a	more	humanitarian	
focused	understanding	of	responsibility.	For	instance,	Lloyds	established	rescue	stations	
around	the	coast	from	1802	onwards.	Building	on	this	infrastructure,	a	private	initiative	
of	philanthropists	gathered	by	Sir	William	Hillary	 founded	 the	National	 Institution	 for	
the	 Preservation	 of	 Life	 from	 Shipwreck	 in	 1824.8	It	 changed	 its	 name	 to	 the	 Royal	
National	 Lifeboat	 Institution	 (RNLI)	 in	1854.	Also	 in	1854,	 the	Merchant	 Shipping	Act	
established	formal	responsibility	for	life	saving	at	sea,	assigning	this	to	the	Coast	Guard	
for	the	first	time	and	placing	the	organisation	under	superintendence	of	the	Admiralty	in	
1856.9	Financial	difficulties	in	the	RNLI	meant	that	the	Board	of	Trade	took	charge	of	its	
affairs	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	Merchant	 Shipping	 Act,	 essentially	merging	 RNLI	 and	
Coast	Guard	services	under	one	roof.	Even	after	the	Board’s	subsidy	ended	in	1869	and	
the	 RNLI	 became	 independent	 and	 reliant	 on	 its	 own	 resources	 once	 more,	 the	
institutional	cooperation	continued.10		
Overall,	 these	 institutional	developments	 in	 the	UK	provided	 the	blueprint	 for	 the	
way	 in	which	SAR	came	 to	be	organised	 in	other	 countries.	The	dual	 responsibility	of	
safeguarding	 sovereignty,	on	 the	one	hand,	 and	protecting	 fellow	human	beings,	often	
																																																								
7	Capacity	was	built	through	installing	watchtowers	along	the	coast.	In	1822	the	Waterguard	was	
transferred	from	the	Treasury	to	Customs	and	the	name	was	changed	to	the	Coast	Guard.	In	1828	the	first	
guidelines	were	published,	among	which	the	Coast	Guards	were	given	responsibility	to	deal	with	
shipwrecks	and	life-saving.	
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://yourarchives.nationalarchives.gov.uk/index.php?titl
e=Coastguard_History	(accessed	June	30	2017)	
8	An	indication	of	Hillary’s	normative	position	can	be	derived	from	the	title	of	his	book	published	in	1825:	
“An	Appeal	to	the	British	Nation	on	the	Humanity	and	Policy	of	Forming	a	National	Institution	for	the	
Preservation	of	Lives	and	Property	from	Shipwreck”.	Like	the	group	of	men	who	lobbied	for	the	abolition	
of	slavery	in	the	UK	around	the	turn	of	the	nineteenth	century,	he	was	also	a	Quaker	(Hochschild	2005)..	
9	In	1923	control	of	the	Coast	Guard	services	was	transferred	to	the	Mercantile	Marine	Department	of	the	
Board	of	Trade	(http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C729)	(accessed	June	30,	2017).	
10	The	German	Maritime	Search	and	Rescue	Service	was	founded	in	1865	and	is	also	still	run	as	a	charity	
financed	through	private	donations,	membership	fees	and	legacies.	The	French	Societé	nationale	de	
sauvetage	en	mer	also	dates	from	1865	and	receives	two-thirds	of	its	income	from	donations.	The	legacy	
of	the	Dutch	Royal	Netherlands	Sea	Rescue	Institution/Koninklijke	Nederlandse	Redding	Maatschappij	
can	be	traced	to	origins	in	1824.	By	comparison,	the	Spanish	Sociedad	Española	de	Salvamento	de	
Náufragos	modelled	itself	on	the	RNLI	but	was	only	set	up	in	1880.	
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through	or	with	the	help	of	private	organisations,	on	the	other,	has	become	the	hallmark	
of	 MDA.	 This	 goes	 to	 show	 that	 the	 material	 capacities	 of	 SAR	 are	 supported	 by	 a	
growing	legal	framework,	which	is	co-constitutive	of	the	expansion	of	states’	abilities	to	
control	the	seas.		
	
SAR	Capacity	in	the	Arctic	
SAR	missions	require	specialised	equipment	and	infrastructure	that	is	land-based,	such	
as	radar	and	satellite	stations,	weather	observation	or	GPS	infrastructure,	as	well	as	sea-
based,	 such	 as	 vessels	 (Wood-Donnelly	 2013)	 –	 in	 other	 words,	 SAR	 is	 capacity-
intensive.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Arctic,	 responsibility	 is	 institutionalised	 through	 a	
framework	 of	 treaties	 and	 conventions	 which	 have	 been	 devised	 over	 the	 course	 of	
several	 decades.	 They	 are	 part	 of	 a	 global	 attempt	 to	 create	 a	 unified	 governance	
arrangement	 on	 the	 seas.	 As	 the	 table	 below	 illustrates,	 SAR	 institutions	 combine	
questions	of	capacity	with	the	dual	concern	of	state	sovereignty	as	well	as	humanitarian	
questions.	
	
Table	1	–	Responsibility	and	SAR	Agreements	over	Time	
Framework	(origin)	 Example	 Responsibility	innovation	
Safety	of	Life	at	Sea	(SOLAS)	
(1914;	repeatedly	updated	
until	1974)	
Specify	number	of	life-boats	 Capacity	building	
Chicago	Convention/	
International	Civil	Aviation	
Organization	(1944)	
Provide	SAR	services;	assist	victims	
of	(aircraft)	accidents	regardless	of	
nationality	
State	capacity	building;	
humanitarian	concerns	trump	
state	sovereignty	
Search	and	Rescue	
Convention	(1979)	
States	to	coordinate	SAR	efforts;	
grant	immediate	entry	to	territory	
Softening	of	state	sovereignty	
UN	Convention	on	the	Law	of	
the	Sea	(UNCLOS)	(1982)	
Coupling	of	sea	and	airspace	 Creation	of	unified	governance	
space	
Arctic	SAR	Agreement	(2011)	 Arctic	Coast	Guard	Forum	(2015)	 Knowledge	creation	through	joint	
exercises;	capacity	coordination	
Source:	author	
	
The	first	of	the	SAR	frameworks	is	the	International	Convention	for	the	Safety	of	Life	at	
Sea	(SOLAS)	which	was	adopted	in	1914	(Byers	2013)	after	the	sinking	of	the	Titanic	in	
1912.	 The	 convention	 was	 updated	 repeatedly	 during	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 and	 its	
1974	 version	 is	 still	 valid.11	Further	 SAR	 regulations	 are	 stipulated	 in	 the	 so-called	
																																																								
11	Since	1974	SOLAS	can	be	updated	and	amended	by	tacit	agreement,	i.e.	automatically	unless	
reservations	have	been	submitted	by	a	certain	number	of	states	by	a	particular	date.	For	example,	SOLAS	
prescribes	the	number	of	life	boats	a	ship	most	provide,	as	well	as		placing	a	requirement	on	each	party	
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Chicago	Convention	 (Convention	on	 International	Civil	Aviation),	which	was	agreed	 in	
1944.	 It	 established	 the	 International	 Civil	 Aviation	 Organization	 (ICAO)	 which	 is	 an	
agency	of	the	UN.	Although	obviously	concerned	with	aviation	issues,	the	convention	has	
an	impact	on	the	rules	of	SAR	at	sea	as	well.	The	ICAO’s	agreement	makes	responsibility	
for	 fellow	human	beings	 central	when	 it	 states	 in	Annex	12	 that	parties	must	provide	
assistance	to	survivors	of	(aircraft)	accidents	regardless	of	nationality,	and	“arrange	for	
the	establishment	and	provision	of	search-and-rescue	services	within	their	 territories”	
on	a	24-hour	basis	(Art	2.1.1).12	Overall,	this	is	a	global	legal	institutionalisation	of	what	
was	 begun	 as	 a	 voluntary	 activity	 in	 the	 early	 nineteenth	 century	 by	 Lloyds	 and	 Sir	
William	Hillary.		
While	this	agreement	is	a	step	towards	coupling	parts	of	the	sea	and	airspace	within	
a	legal	regime,	which	was	continued	in	the	United	Nations	Convention	on	the	Law	of	the	
Sea	 (UNCLOS),	 the	 Chicago	 Convention	 also	 highlights	 how	 humanitarian	 concerns	
trump	national	sovereignty.	The	Convention	recommends	that	rescue	centres	–	and	not	
a	central	authority	–	should	coordinate	directly	with	neighbouring	states	in	relation	to	
all	issues	necessary	to	allow	personnel,	machines	and	equipment	from	another	state	into	
its	territory,	regardless	of	visa	arrangements	etc.	(Art.	3.1.6).	Delegating	this	paperwork	
to	 a	 local	 agency	 can	be	 interpreted	 as	 a	move	 to	 emphasise	 the	 intention	 to	 provide	
assistance	over	concerns	of	sovereignty.	This	cooperative	spirit	was	carried	over	almost	
verbatim	 into	 the	1979	SAR	Convention,13	which	demands	 that	 states	 coordinate	 their	
efforts	(Art.	3.1.1)	and	that	“immediate	entry”	is	granted	to	a	neighbouring	state	for	SAR	
purposes	(Art.	3.1.2),	although	national	regulations	could	still	bar	 foreign	parties	 from	
entering.	Parts	of	the	SAR	Convention	match	the	Chicago	Convention	closely,	but	overall	
it	was	a	significant	step	towards	establishing	a	framework	for	missions	at	sea.	
Despite	 being	 parties	 to	 the	 1944	 Chicago	 Convention	 and	 the	 1979	 SAR	
Convention,	 the	 Arctic	 states	 also	 devised	 their	 own	 “Agreement	 on	 Cooperation	 in	
Aeronautical	and	Maritime	Search	and	Rescue	in	the	Arctic”,	which	was	signed	in	2011.	
Given	 the	 background	 of	 existing	 law,	 it	 is	 not	 entirely	 surprising	 that	 this	 new	
																																																																																																																																																																													
“to	ensure	that	any	necessary	arrangements	are	made	for	coast	watching	and	for	the	rescue	of	persons	in	
distress	at	sea	round	its	coasts”	(cited	in	Byers	2013).	
12	Available	from	https://de.scribd.com/document/18191224/Anexo-12-Search-and-Rescue	(accessed	
September	14,	2017).	This	agreement	also	covers	the	high	seas	or	“areas	of	undetermined	sovereignty”	–	
with	zones	of	responsibility	in	those	latter	areas	being	determined	by	regional	air	navigation	agreements	
(Art.	2.1.1.1).	
13	Available	from:	https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201405/volume-1405-i-
23489-english.pdf	(accessed	September	14,	2017).	
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agreement	adds	“nothing	to	the	rules	that	are	already	binding	on	the	Arctic	countries”	
(Byers	2013),	even	though	the	Arctic	Council	appears	very	proud	to	communicate	that	
this	 is	 the	 first	 legally	 binding	 agreement	 that	 was	 negotiated	 under	 its	 guidance.14	
Commentators	regard	the	agreement	as	a	 trust-building	tool	as	 it	encourages	but	does	
not	require	the	sharing	of:	information	services	and	procedures,	techniques,	equipment	
and	 facilities;	 joint	 research	 and	 development	 initiatives;	 and	 joint	 search-and-rescue	
exercises	 (Exner-Pirot	 2012;	 Byers	 2013;	 Wood-Donnelly	 2013).	 The	 agreement	
supports	 collaboration	 in	 mutual	 exercises	 and	 operations,	 including	 exchange	 visits	
between	 personnel	 (SAR	 Agreement	 2011,	 Article	 9.3),	 which	 has	 been	 successfully	
realised	with	 the	help	of	 the	Arctic	Coast	Guard	Forum	(Eckstein	2016).	 In	particular,	
observers	praise	the	pragmatic	approach	towards	saving	lives	and	emergency	response	
that	 prevails	 among	 colleagues	 from	 different	 countries,	 even	 during	 times	 of	
geopolitical	 tensions	 (Sevunts	 2018).	 In	 recent	 years	 the	 Coast	 Guard	 Forum	 has	
conducted	 operative	 as	 well	 as	 so-termed	 table-top	 exercises,	 i.e.	 simulations,	 to	
increase	SAR	capacity	and	prepare	for	crises	(see	Table	2).	
	
Table	2	–	Arctic	SAR	Exercises,	excl.	expert	meetings	
Time	and	Place	 Exercise	 Outcome	
October	2011,	
Whitehorse,	
Yukon,	Canada15	
First	table-top	
exercise		
Focus	on	potential	air	and	marine	accidents	that	could	happen	
in	the	Arctic	and	require	international	cooperation	and	
necessities	
April	2016,	
Anchorage,	
Alaska16	
Northwest	
Passage	table-
top	exercise	
Prepare	for	cruise	ship	emergency	involving	1600+	passengers;	
triggered	by	Crystal	Serenity	crossing	of	Northwest	Passage;	
discuss	response	capability	and	awareness	between	the	US	and	
Canadian	federal	agencies	
June	2016,	
Montreal,	
Canada17	
Arctic	Council	
EPPR	meeting;	
table-top	
exercise	
Oil	pollution	and	spill	prevention	exercise	under	Marine	Oil	
Pollution	Preparedness	and	Response	in	the	Arctic	agreement	
(MOSPA);	development	of	processes	and	communication	in	
workshop	and	SAR	expert	group	meeting	
August	2016,	
Kotzebue,	
Alaska18	
“Arctic	Chinook”		 Testing	Arctic	SAR	interoperability,	capability	and	limitations	
on	scenario	with	an	adventure-class	cruise	ship	of	around	200	
passengers	and	crew	
September	2017,	
Iceland19	
“Arctic	
Guardian”	
First	ACGF	operative	exercise	based	on	scenario	of	a	missing	
cruise	ship	with	250	people	on	board	sailing	from	Greenland	to	
Iceland	
March	2018,	Oulu,	
Finland20	
Swedish-Finnish	
Oil	Spill	
Exercise	run	under	MOSPA	and	the	Copenhagen	Agreement	
																																																								
14	Available	from:	http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work/agreements	(accessed	30	June,	
2017).	
15 Compare National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (2011).  
16 Compare article by The Maritime Executive (2016).  
17 Compare Arctic Council (2016).  
18 Compare Gordinier (2016). 
19  Compare Arctic Coast Guard Forum (2017) . 
20 Compare Finnish Environment Institute (2018). 
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Response	
Exercise	
Source:	author	
	
Figure	2	about	here	
	
The	Normative	Quality	of	SAR	
Rather	than	treating	different	forms	of	capacity	 in	 isolation,	we	can	attempt	to	explain	
the	 significance	 of	 the	 institutionalisation	 of	 responsibility	 in	 SAR	policies	 through	 an	
interpretation	 of	 the	web	 of	 practices	 (compare	 Figure	 2).	 Trust	 between	 states	 is	 an	
attribute	 that	 purely	 power-oriented	 approaches	 find	 hard	 to	 conceptualise	 in	 global	
politics	(Michel	2013).	The	understanding	of	responsibility	with	regard	to	SAR	is	rather	
indicative	of	a	cooperative	spirit,	which	develops	gradually	over	time,	and	of	the	ability	
to	overcome	fears	of	‘losing	face’	when	asking	for	help,	which	was	the	case	in	the	context	
of	the	2000	Kursk	submarine	disaster.	It	also	implies	the	willingness	to	restrain	oneself	
and	contribute	to	a	shared	nomos	(Lebow	2003),	i.e.	the	laws	and	conventions	that	bind	
international	 society	 together.	 The	 SAR	 agreement	 is	 normatively	 embedded	 in	 a	
humanitarian	 outlook	 which	 puts	 the	 survival	 of	 individuals	 at	 its	 centre	 while	
reaffirming	that	states	are	the	principle	actors	in	this	context	(Wood-Donnelly	2013).	As	
the	Canadian	Lt.-Gen.	Semianiw	stated	in	the	context	of	the	first	table-top	exercise	under	
SAR	in	2011,	
	
The	challenges	posed	by	the	landscape,	the	climate	and	the	vast	distances	cannot	be	an	excuse	for	
not	 fulfilling	all	our	SAR	capabilities.	But	 the	developments	 in	 the	Arctic	mean	 that	we	must	all	
work	together	to	ensure	that	citizens	of	each	of	our	nations	who	work	and	live	in	the	north	can	
expect	timely	responses	when	they	are	in	distress.	(Arctic	Council	2011)	
	
While	this	development	was	enabled	by	a	change	in	the	general	geopolitical	context	that	
saw	a	reconfiguration	of	the	principle	of	sovereignty	during	the	1990s	(Glanville	2014),	
we	 need	 to	 caution	 against	 a	 teleological	 interpretation	 of	 this	 trajectory.	 Other	 than	
stating	 that	 this	 is	 a	 potentially	 positive	 development,	 there	 is	 no	 guarantee	 that	
responsibility	 for	 humanity	 will	 continue	 to	 trump	 the	 assertion	 of	 sovereignty.	 The	
reason	 for	 this	 potential	 shift	 is	 that	 the	 development	 of	 SAR	 only	 works	 based	 on	
increased	 MDA	 capacity	 that	 is	 spread	 across	 civilian	 and	 military	 agencies.21	Their	
																																																																																																																																																																													
	
21	The	different	agencies	responsible	for	SAR	include the Canadian Forces and Canadian Coast Guard, the 
Danish Maritime Authority, the Danish Transport Authority, the Ministry of Fisheries – Faroe Islands, the 
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exact	tasks	are	subject	to	state	regulation,	which	means	that	they	can	change	over	time.	
While	 the	SAR	agreement	provides	a	 legal	capacity	 to	 legitimately	build	 infrastructure	
and	encourages	cross-border	cooperation,	the	potential	for	dual	use	(Forge	2010)	of	this	
infrastructure	 means	 that	 its	 originally	 intended	 use	 may	 not	 be	 the	 only	 one.	 The	
statement	made	by	 Lt.-Gen.	 Semianiw	 in	 the	 spirit	 of	 sharing	 responsibility	 for	 fellow	
human	beings	stands	in	contrast	to	more	recent	observations	that,	
	
Coast	guards	uphold	sovereignty	through	naval	presence	and	the	enforcement	of	national	
jurisdiction.	Fisheries	inspections,	for	example,	are	an	integral	part	of	protecting	a	state’s	sovereign	
rights,	through	the	management	of	its	own	marine	resources.	This	authority	cannot	be	shared	
without	the	coastal	state	ceding	some	of	its	sovereignty.	Therefore,	there	are	some	limitations	to	the	
extent	of	collaboration	within	the	framework	of	the	Arctic	Coast	Guard	Forum.	(Østhagen	2016,	4)	
	
Further	problems	for	cooperation	arise	because	Russia	is	not	a	member	of	NATO,	which	
means	 that	 sensitive	 information	may	not	be	 shared	 freely	 among	all	members	of	 the	
Forum.	After	all,	as	the	US	Coast	Guard’s	Adm.	Zukunft	holds,	“(T)he	forum	is	not	likely	
to	 take	 up	 more	 contentious	 issues,	 such	 as	 freedom	 of	 navigation	 and	 issues	 of	
sovereignty	 (…because	 it	 primarily	 exists)	 for	 navigational	 safety”	 (CBC	 News	 2015).	
Potentially,	 therefore,	 there	 is	 a	 dark	 side	 to	 institutionalising	 responsibility	 in	 the	
Arctic,	because	despite	the	cooperative	approach	to	pragmatic	issues,	it	is	unclear	how	
normative	differences	can	be	bridged.	
Obviously	such	development	cannot	be	predicted	with	certainty,	not	least	because	it	
is	difficult	to	foresee	at	this	point	how	the	use	of	the	Arctic	Ocean	is	going	to	develop	–	
i.e.	 if,	when,	and	to	what	extent	 it	will	be	free	of	 ice	for	at	 least	some	parts	of	the	year	
(Keskitalo	 2004;	 Byers	 2009;	 Humrich	 and	 Wolf	 2011;	 Koivurova	 2011;	 Keil	 2014).	
Countries	may	be	increasingly	likely	to	evoke	the	law	of	the	sea	concerning	freedom	of	
navigation	 (Kraska	 and	 Fahey	 2017),	 just	 as	 the	 Arctic	 5	 states	 agreed	 to	 uphold	
international	 law	 in	 their	 joint	 Ilulissat	Declarations	 in	 2008	 (Dodds	 2008).	However,	
this	 principle	 of	 maritime	 governance,	 according	 to	 which	 ships	 may	 pass	 through	
international	 straights	 unhindered,	 is	 contested	 in	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 world,	 for	
instance	between	China	and	the	United	States	 in	 the	South	and	East	China	Sea	(Glaser	
2012),22	but	also	in	the	Arctic	where	the	USA	and	Canada	continue	to	disagree	over	the	
																																																																																																																																																																													
Finnish Border Guard, the Icelandic Coast Guard, the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre Northern Norway 
(JRCC NN Bodø), the Russian Federal Air Transport Agency and Russian Federal Agency for Marine and River 
Transport, the Swedish Maritime Administration, and the United States Coast Guard and Department of Defense 
(compare Exner-Pirot 2012, endnote 8). 
22	The	US	Department	of	Defense	publishes	a	list	of	their	freedom	of	navigation	operations:	
http://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/FON/	(accessed	August	1,	2017).	
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status	 of	 the	 Northwest	 Passage,	 i.e.	 whether	 it	 is	 an	 international	 straight	 (the	 US	
position)	 or	 whether	 it	 constitutes	 international	 waters	 (the	 Canadian	 position).	
Building	 capacity	 for	 MDA	 in	 the	 name	 of	 responsibility	 could	 eventually	 be	 used	 to	
restrict	 access	 to	 the	 Northern	 Sea	 Route	 by	 Russia	 (Kraska	 and	 Fahey	 2017;	 Royal	
United	 Services	 Institute	 2017).	 Therefore,	 with	 the	 view	 that	 open	 waters	 are	
preferable	to	closed	ones,	one	might	be	sceptical	regarding	the	long-term	implications	of	
this	development.	
To	summarise,	then,	a	holistic	approach	to	responsibility	that	focuses	on	the	social	
processes	through	which	it	comes	to	life	demonstrates	that	capacity-building	on	its	own	
does	 not	 guarantee	 agreement	 among	 participants	 on	 what	 constitutes	 the	 nomos	
(Lebow	2003).	In	particular,	projecting	power	and	appearing	as	a	powerful	actor	is	one	
of	the	key	aspects	of	Russian	Arctic	politics	(Piskunova	2010;	Laruelle	2014).	However,	
as	militarisation	and	security	are	 topics	 that	are	explicitly	omitted	 from	the	agenda	of	
the	 Arctic	 Council,	 the	 question	 of	 how	militarisation	 could	 be	 guided	 to	 ensure	 that	
capacity	is	channelled	towards	the	appropriate	cause	remains	unaddressed.	The	Arctic	
Council	brings	 together	at	 least	 two	actors,	 the	USA	and	Russia,	who	have	a	history	of	
non-cooperation.	While	the	agreement	on	SAR	is	remarkable,	their	presence	and	future	
convergence	 on	 normative	 principles	 guiding	 responsibility	 at	 sea	 stands	 out	 as	
something	 that	 requires	 further	 discussion	 and	 investigation.	 As	 long	 as	 there	 is	 no	
agreement	that	freedom	of	navigation	under	the	United	Nations	Convention	on	the	Law	
of	the	Sea	is	a	fundamental	right	and	a	ius	cogens	norm,	capacity-building	for	the	sake	of	
taking	 responsibility	may	 legitimise	 building	 the	 infrastructure	 that	 helps	 states	 close	
sea	routes.	
	
Sustainable	Development	
While	the	SAR	agreement	provides	a	way	to	deal	with	 increased	human	activity	 in	the	
Arctic	 in	 general,	 further	 cooperation	 based	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 sustainable	 development	
underpins	 the	 qualitative	 aspects	 of	 these	 activities.	 Members	 of	 the	 Arctic	 Council	
generally	agree	 that	human	activity	 in	 the	Arctic	must	 follow	principles	of	 sustainable	
development,	 thereby	 taking	 responsibility	 for	 their	 conduct	 and	 for	 their	 relations	
towards	 other	 actors	 in	 the	 area.	 In	 the	 following	 paragraphs	 I	 argue	 that	 although	
sustainable	development	firmly	anchors	responsibility	in	the	Arctic	in	a	web	of	relations	
between	states	and	non-state	actors	that	specifies	rights	and	obligations,	doubts	about	
the	longevity	and	the	overall	benefits	of	this	arrangement	arise	when	we	consider	that	
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states	 need	 to	 meet	 diverging	 responsibilities	 simultaneously.	 To	 demonstrate	 the	
advantage	 of	 the	 approach	 taken	 in	 this	 article,	 I	 first	 show	 the	 origins	 of	 sustainable	
development	in	the	Arctic	and	highlight	institutionalisation	as	a	legacy	of	the	Brundtland	
Report,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 empowerment	 of	 local	 actors.	 Yet,	 as	 the	 second	 step	 shows,	
developing	 capacity	 is	 not	 an	 unambiguously	 positive	 issue.	 Web	 of	 responsibility	
relationships	shed	 light	not	only	on	competing	claims	to	competence	–	between	states	
and	non-state	actors	–	but	also	on	the	diverse	relations	of	responsibility	that	each	actors	
might	be	entangled	 in	 (compare	Figure	3).	 For	 the	purpose	of	 showing	 the	 conflicting	
relations	of	 responsibility	 in	 the	context	of	 sustainable	Arctic	development,	 the	article	
adopts	 a	 narrow	approach	 to	 the	 concept	 and	 focuses	mostly	 on	 states	 and	non-state	
actors,	especially	indigenous	people.	
	
Figure	3	about	here	
	
Subjects	and	Sustainable	Development	and	Capacities		
The	case	of	responsibility	for	sustainable	development	in	the	Arctic	is	more	complicated	
than	 search	 and	 rescue.	We	 are	dealing	with	more	 actors	whose	 legitimacy	 to	 engage	
with	sustainability	is	derived	from	a	number	of	capacity-enhancing	sources.	At	the	same	
time	 the	 object	 of	 responsibility	 cannot	 be	 clearly	 delineated	 either,	 pointing	 towards	
potential	conflicts	of	interests	or	priorities.	
The	Arctic	8	are	the	primary	subjects	of	responsibility	for	sustainable	development,	
but	 the	 distinctive	 arrangement	 of	 the	 Arctic	 Council	 means	 that	 they	 are	 joined	 by	
representatives	 of	 indigenous	 populations	 from	 the	 region,	 the	 so-termed	 Permanent	
Participants.	 Even	 though	 the	 Permanent	 Participants	 have	 the	 right	 to	 active	
participation	and	consultation	but	no	right	 to	vote,	 they	can	effectively	veto	 initiatives	
by	states	since	the	mode	of	decision-making	in	the	Council	is	by	consensus	(Nord	2016,	
38	and	70).	This	multi-stakeholder	governance	arrangement	of	power	sharing	places	the	
Permanent	 Participants	 at	 quasi	 eye-level	with	 states,	 and	makes	 the	Arctic	 Council	 a	
unique	governance	experiment	in	contemporary	global	politics.	Permanent	Participants	
occupy	a	much	stronger	position	 in	 the	Arctic	Council	 than	 the	other	official	state	and	
non-state	 observers,	 even	 though	many	 of	 these	 are	 incomparably	 better	 endowed	 in	
terms	of	material	capacity.	
This	bifocal	arrangement	of	actors	at	the	heart	of	the	Arctic	Council	can	be	explained	
through	the	trajectory	of	the	institution	and	the	legal-material	capacities	from	which	it	
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grew,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 wider	 normative	 context	 that	 empowers	 non-state	 actors	 in	
international	 politics.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 Brundtland	 Report	 provided	 some	 of	 the	
impetus	 for	 a	 global	 turn	 towards	 reconsidering	 environmental	 issues.	 In	 this	 context	
Finnish	and	Canadian	initiatives,	as	well	as	changes	in	the	geopolitical	setting	at	the	end	
of	 the	1980s	 and	 in	 the	 early	 1990s,	were	 conducive	 to	 enhancing	Arctic	 cooperation	
(Keskitalo	 2004;	 Langhelle,	 Blindheim	 et	 al.	 2008).	 As	 a	 precursor	 to	 the	 Council,	
emphasising	what	would	 later	 become	 the	 Council’s	 environmental	 pillar,	 the	 Finnish	
government	 developed	 the	 Arctic	 Environmental	 Protection	 Strategy	 (Arctic	
Environmental	Protection	Strategy	1991	short:	AEPS)	which	was	“highly	influenced	by	
the	 Brundtland	 Report”	 (Langhelle,	 Blindheim	 et	 al.	 2008).	 The	 AEPS	 stated	 in	 its	
objectives	 that	 sustainable	 economic	 development	 should	 not	 have	 unacceptable	
ecological	 and	 cultural	 impacts.	 The	 concept	 of	 responsibility	 developed	 in	 the	 AEPS	
echoes	the	one	propagated	in	the	Brundtland	Report.	It	states	that,	
	
Management,	planning	and	development	activities	shall	provide	for	the	conservation,	sustainable	
utilization	and	protection	of	Arctic	ecosystems	and	natural	resources	for	the	benefit	and	
enjoyment	of	present	and	future	generations,	including	indigenous	peoples.	(AEPS	1991,	9–10)	
	
Subsequently,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 organisational	 differentiation	 that	 had	 begun	 under	
AEPS,	 once	 the	 Arctic	 Council	 was	 officially	 founded	 following	 persistent	 Canadian	
initiatives	(Nord	2016),	cooperation	focused	on	themes	ranging	from	the	monitoring	of	
pollutants,	 the	 conservation	 of	 flora	 and	 fauna,	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 maritime	
environment,	 and	 cooperation	mechanisms	 to	 respond	 to	 environmental	 emergencies.	
In	1998	the	Sustainable	Development	Working	Group	(SDWG)	was	established.	Again,	it	
took	its	mandate	from	the	understanding	of	responsibility	developed	in	the	Brundtland	
Report.	 The	 Sustainable	 Development	 Action	 Plan	 became	 the	 SDWG’s	 strategic	
framework.	 It	 included	 economic,	 social	 and	 environmental	 dimensions	of	 sustainable	
development,	 such	 as	 the	 sustainable	 use	 of	 resources,	 sustainable	 economic	 activity	
and	 increasing	 the	prosperity	 of	Arctic	 communities,	 gender	 equality,	 enhancing	well-
being	 and	 the	 eradication	 of	 poverty	 among	 Arctic	 people,	 biodiversity	 conservation,	
and	 climate	 change	 impact	 assessment,	 among	 others	 (Arctic	 Council	 2004).	 Most	
importantly,	 the	 SDWG	 introduced	 a	 particular	 “human	 dimension”	 (Nord	 2016)	 to	
responsibility,	 prioritising	 health,	 education,	 employment	 or	 changes	 in	 lifestyle	 as	
opposed	to	business	opportunities	or	environmental	protection.	
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On	 the	other	hand,	 the	Brundtland	Report	also	empowered	 the	 role	of	 indigenous	
populations	 in	 global	 politics.	 The	 report	 recognises	 that	 development	policies	 should	
occur	in	close	cooperation	with	local	populations.	Article	77	of	the	report	states,	
	
Those	promoting	policies	that	have	an	impact	on	the	lives	of	an	isolated,	traditional	people	must	
tread	a	fine	line	between	keeping	them	in	artificial,	perhaps	unwanted	isolation	and	wantonly	
destroying	their	life-styles.	Hence	broader	measures	of	human	resource	development	are	
essential.	Health	facilities	must	be	provided	to	supplement	and	improve	traditional	practices;	
nutritional	deficiencies	have	to	be	corrected,	and	educational	institutions	established.	These	steps	
should	precede	new	projects	that	open	up	an	area	to	economic	development.	Special	efforts	
should	also	be	made	to	ensure	that	the	local	community	can	derive	the	full	benefit	of	such	
projects,	particularly	through	jobs.	
	
It	is	not	least	with	regard	to	the	principles	of	health	and	education	provision,	as	well	as	
the	 prospect	 of	 benefiting	 from	 jobs	 created,	 that	 the	 former	 president	 of	 the	 Inuit	
Circumpolar	 Council	 (ICC)	 reminded	 states	with	 an	 interest	 in	 investing	 in	 the	 Arctic	
that	 their	 “first	 responsibility”	 lay	 in	 cooperating	 with	 the	 indigenous	 population.	 He	
stated	at	a	conference	in	Berlin	that,	
	 	
I	would	like	to	undermine	that	the	most	important	responsibility	of	anyone	who	comes	to	work	in	
the	Arctic	or	seek	economic	opportunities	in	the	Arctic:	your	First	Responsibility	(sic)	is	to	work	
in	partnership	with	Inuit.	(Lynge	2010)	
	
Representatives	of	 the	 indigenous	populations	have	 repeatedly	asserted	 their	position	
that	 they	 participate	 in	 the	 forum	 as	 an	 entity	with	 sovereign	 rights,	which	 draws	 its	
legitimacy	from	having	lived	in	the	area	prior	to	the	establishment	of	states	and	from	the	
United	Nations	Declaration	of	the	Rights	of	Indigenous	Peoples	(Nord	2016).	Their	claim	
is	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 Council	 as	 rights	 holders	 and	 not	 just	 merely	 stakeholders	
(Shadian	 2017).	 In	 this	 light,	 it	 is	 only	 consistent	 that	 they	 continue	 to	 insist	 that	
research	should	benefit	their	own	development.23	
	
Objects	of	Responsibility	and	the	Normative	Quality	of	Responsibility	
The	 coexistence	of	 state	 and	non-state	 actors	 in	 the	Arctic	Council	 is	 unique	 in	 global	
politics,	and	 is	working	surprisingly	well.	However,	 it	also	complicates	 the	question	of	
who	 takes	 responsibility	 and	 what	 for,	 because	 the	 Permanent	 Participants	 share	
responsibility	 for	 their	 homelands	 under	 the	 Declaration	 with	 states.24	In	 the	 future	
																																																								
23	Arctic	Frontiers	conference	2018	in	Tromsø,	author’s	observation.	
24	Permanent	Participants	do	not	hold	sovereignty	like	states,	but	their	involvement	in	consultation	
means	they	can	exert	quasi-vetoes,	and	their	own	perception	is	that	they	are	sovereign	rights	holders	
rather	than	merely	stakeholders.	Their	presence	in	the	Arctic	Council	challenges	conventional	
understandings	of	sovereignty	in	International	Relations	(compare	Shadian	2017,	53).		
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human	development	aspects	may	diverge	from	what	can	be	regarded	as	more	narrowly	
conceived	understandings	 of	 economic	 development.	 The	 set-up	 of	 the	Arctic	 Council,	
with	at	least	two	groups	that	lay	claim	to	sovereignty	over	the	same	space,	and	themes	
that	 may	 yield	 conflicting	 policies,	 such	 as	 environmental	 protection	 and	 sustainable	
development,	seems	conducive	to	heightening	tensions	between	actors	and	over	issues.	
In	particular,	 states	who	bear	 formal	powers	 for	policy	 implementation	may	 find	 that	
they	 are	 torn	 between	 competing	 responsibilities	 that	 they	 have	 to	 reconcile	
simultaneously.	
This	 dilemma	 is	 illustrated	 by	 a	 growing	 body	 of	 research	 that	 addresses	
sustainable	 development	 in	 the	 Arctic.	 The	 lead	 authors	 of	 the	 first	 Arctic	 Human	
Development	Report	(AHDR-I)	argued	that	“large	quantities	of	profits	and	rents,	arising	
mostly	from	the	extraction	of	natural	resources	on	a	large	scale,	 flow	out	of	the	Arctic,	
depriving	 authorities	 in	 the	 region	 or	 potential	 sources	 of	 revenue”	 (Einarsson	 and	
Young	2004).	This	situation	improved	to	some	extent	over	the	course	of	the	next	decade.	
The	 second	 Arctic	 Human	 Development	 Report	 (AHDR-II)	 highlights	 a	 number	 of	
success	 stories,	 such	as	 the	 increased	use	of	native	 languages	 in	 the	education	system	
and	an	increased	use	of	 indigenous	knowledge,	 increased	local	ownership,	control	and	
participation	in	resource	extraction	industries,	 innovative	governance	arrangements	in	
which	indigenous	populations	achieve	self-determination	and	forms	of	self-government,	
and	the	emergence	of	Arctic	and	indigenous	identities	as	a	cultural	resource,	 including	
increased	marketability	(Larsen	and	Fondahl	2014).	
However,	this	is	not	to	say	that	all	is	going	well	in	terms	of	sustainable	development.	
Concerns	have	been	voiced	regarding	problems	of	emigration	out	of	the	region	by	young	
and	 skilled	 people	 and	 the	 continuity	 of	 poverty	 issues,	 among	 others.	 There	 is	 a	
growing	discussion	about	 the	necessity	of	sustainable	development	as	an	empowering	
tool	 for	people	 in	 the	area,	 though	often	with	perhaps	an	unduly	narrow	emphasis	on	
preserving	 local	 and	 indigenous	 ways	 of	 life	 (Magga,	 Mathiesen	 et	 al.	 2014).	
Nevertheless,	 while	 there	 is	 widespread	 consensus	 among	 all	 members	 of	 the	 Arctic	
Council	 that	 sustainable	 development	 should	 be	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 policy	 making,	 the	
SDWG’s	information	guide	on	mining	highlights	that		
Although	the	overall	value	and	benefits	of	significant	levels	of	activities	across	the	Arctic	are	national	
and	perhaps	global,	mineral	projects	and	effects	happen	largely	at	the	community	level	in	specific	
areas,	frequently	bringing	with	them	long-term	environmental	impacts	and	risks.	The	local	economy,	
society,	culture	and	environment	go	through	a	transformation	as	new	investment,	jobs	and	activities	
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affect	how	traditional	activities	are	pursued	and	passed	on	from	generation	to	generation.	
(Sustainable	Development	Working	Group	2011,	6)	
As	expressed	in	the	quote,	change	seems	inevitable	and	it	is	not	certain	which	direction	
it	will	take.	Local	communities	in	the	Arctic	are	increasingly	affected	for	better	or	worse,	
but	states	also	hold	responsibility	for	communities	outside	the	region.	It	is	thus	possible	
to	speak	of	multiple	objects	of	responsibility	in	the	context	of	sustainable	development	
in	the	Arctic.	
One	example	of	this	is	the	recent	climate	lawsuit	brought	by	Nature	and	Youth	and	
Greenpeace	against	the	Norwegian	state.	They	argue	that	the	Norwegian	government	is	
in	 contravention	 of	 the	 2015	 Paris	 Agreement	 and	 has	 violated	 the	 Norwegian	
constitutional	 right	 to	 a	 healthy	 and	 safe	 environment	 for	 current	 and	 future	
generations	 (Greenpeace	 2017).	 Another	 example	 concerns	 the	 capacity-building	
projects	 that	are	being	developed	across	the	north	of	Scandinavia	and	 in	the	Canadian	
Arctic.	Justified	in	terms	of	state-level	responsibility	towards	local	populations,	there	is	
considerable	interest	in	improving	and	building	infrastructure	to	further	integrate	local	
knowledge	 and	 development	 (Bertelsen	 and	 Justinussen	 2016;	 Nord	 2016),	 such	 as	
high-speed	internet	connections	(Windeyer	2016)	as	well	as	rail	lines	that	link	the	Arctic	
Ocean	 to	 the	 Baltic	 Sea	 (Staalesen	 2017).	 However,	 it	 remains	 to	 be	 seen	 who	 will	
benefit	from	these	developments	in	the	long-run,	i.e.	whether	the	investments	will	help	
to	mitigate	the	problems	addressed	in	the	AHDRs,	which	would	strengthen	a	normative	
commitment	 to	 humanitarian	 policies,	 or	 whether	 these	 are	 merely	 convenient	
arguments	 to	 reduce	 local	 scepticism	 towards	 large-scale	 development	 projects	
(Flyvbjerg	2001).		
Both	 examples	 highlight	 that	 responsibility	 is	 embedded	 in	 a	 web	 of	 normative	
relations,	 yet	 the	 competing	 responsibility	 links	 may	 be	 mutually	 exclusive.	 The	
entanglement	thereby	raises	questions	about	democratic	and	legal	accountability	which	
one	 could	 pursue	 in	 further	 research:	who	 gets	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 decision	making	
process?	What	kind	of	contractual	relations	exist	between	government	and	citizens,	on	
the	one	hand,	 and	between	governments	 and	 investing	 companies	on	 the	other?	Both	
states	 and	 representatives	 of	 indigenous	 populations	 have	 been	 empowered	 by	 an	
evolving	 framework	 of	 Arctic	 and	 extra-Arctic	 agreements	 and	 conventions	 to	 take	
responsibility	 for	 the	particular	object	 that	 is	 sustainable	development.	However,	as	 it	
turns	out,	it	is	not	entirely	clear	whose	development	it	is	that	needs	to	be	taken	care	of	
In	 the	 case	of	 industrial	 activity,	 for	 example,	 questions	may	be	 raised	 about	whether	
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there	 is	 a	 particular	 responsibility	 towards	 the	 local	 population	 who	 would	 be	
immediately	affected	by	air-borne	pollutants,	 let	alone	oil	spills,	or	whether	a	case	can	
be	made	 that	 the	 extracted	 revenues	would	 bring	 benefits	 to	 the	 country	 as	 a	whole.	
Similarly,	 one	 can	 ask	whether	 it	 is	 present	 or	 future	 generations	 for	whom	 subjects	
have	responsibility.	
	
	
	
Conclusion	
Responsibility	 has	 evolved	 as	 a	 global	 policy	 norm	 in	 different	 governance	 strands	
whose	 common	 denominator	 is	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 Brundtland	 Report.	 The	 report	
managed	 to	 bridge	 seemingly	 incompatible	 concepts,	 such	 as	 environmental	
responsibility	 and	 economic	 development,	 while	 also	 enabling	 a	 reinterpretation	 of	
sovereignty	as	responsibility.	 In	the	 latter	case	this	 is	supposed	to	be	protected	by	the	
international	community	in	case	a	state	fails	in	this	undertaking	vis-à-vis	its	citizens.	In	
different	 forms,	 responsibility	 for	 security	 and	 for	 sustainable	 development	 have	
become	institutionalised	in	the	Arctic	region,	which	sees	a	heightened	amount	of	human	
activity	as	a	consequence	of	climate	change	impact.	When	we	ask	the	question	of	what	it	
means	to	be	responsible	in	and	for	the	Arctic,	we	must	take	account	of	a	certain	degree	
of	 ambiguity	 –	 between	 the	 intention	 to	 ensure	 sovereignty	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	
supporting	humanity	on	the	other.	
Search	and	rescue	operations	have	long-standing	historical	roots	in	which	a	strategy	
to	ensure	state	sovereignty	is	coupled	with	a	concern	for	humanity.	Today	this	duality	is	
visible	in	the	dual	use	of	MDA	infrastructure,	the	expansion	of	which	builds	on	several	
multilateral	 agreements	 among	 Arctic	 states	 (and	 globally).	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 this	
strengthens	a	state’s	role	by	taking	control	over	maritime	territory.	States	thus	prepare	
for	 increased	 economic	 activity	 following	 a	 thawing	 of	 Arctic	 ice	 and	 the	 opening	 of	
potentially	 accessible	 waterways	 for	 some	 part	 of	 the	 year.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	
potential	 downside	 might	 be	 that	 the	 building	 of	 infrastructure	 could	 be	 seen	 as	
militarisation	because	of	its	potential	dual	use	(Ministry	of	Defence	2017).	One	day	this	
might	affect	state	relations	–	for	example,	the	US	are	questioning	the	legal	status	of	the	
Northwest	Passage	or	the	Northern	Sea	Route	(aka	the	Northeast	Passage).	
The	second	field	of	enquiry	in	this	article	was	sustainable	development,	which	has	a	
similarly	 institutionalised	 trajectory.	 This	 has	 been	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	 Arctic	 Council’s	
concerns	 since	before	 the	Council’s	 founding,	 drawing	 significant	 inspiration	 from	 the	
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Brundtland	 Report.	 After	 twenty	 years	 there	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 some	 success	 in	
empowering	 local	 populations,	 even	 though	 the	 impact	 of	 climate	 change	 and	 other	
factors	might	still	drive	some	people	out	of	the	region.	Nevertheless,	questions	remain	
about	whether	responsibility	 is	used	in	terms	of	advancing	human	development	in	the	
region,	or	whether	there	are	other	normative	principles	that	foresee	state	responsibility	
linked	to	other	objectives.	It	remains	to	be	seen	what	the	long-term	implications	of	the	
projects	 will	 be,	 but	 as	 the	 examples	 of	 the	 lawsuit	 against	 the	 Norwegian	 state	 and	
potential	 problems	 of	 infrastructure	 development	make	 plain,	 it	 is	 not	 too	 difficult	 to	
imagine	scenarios	that	are	not	fully	beneficial	to	human	development	concerns.	
With	 a	 view	 to	 the	 broader	 debate	 about	 responsibility	 as	 a	 normative	 pillar	 in	
global	 politics,	 both	 cases	 underscore	 the	 value	 that	 can	 be	 derived	 from	 a	 holistic	
approach	 to	 responsibility.	 The	 article	 argues	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 move	 beyond	 a	
search	 for	 first	 principles	 that	 focuses	 on	 material	 capacity	 or	 legal	 provisions	 to	
determine	 accountability.	 Responsibilising	 an	 issue	 establishes	 contractual	 relations	
between	 subjects	 and	 objects	 of	 responsibility.	 It	 involves	 normative	 expectations	
regarding	 the	 existence,	 use	 and	 possible	 moral	 obligations	 of	 different	 forms	 of	
capacity,	while	also	establishing	or	reinforcing	hierarchies	between	actors	participating	
in	 the	 process.	 Finally,	 assigning	 responsibility	may	 also	 highlight	 an	 actor’s	 potential	
conflicts	 of	 interest,	 and	 the	 need	 to	 discriminate	 between	 different	 objects	 of	
responsibility.	
All	of	this	shows	that	responsibility	is	a	social	product	that	is	negotiated	in	a	context	
of	capabilities,	but	how	these	play	out	cannot	be	interpreted	without	a	close	look	at	the	
day-to-day	practices	and	the	relations	between	those	involved.	The	question	of	the	basis	
on	which	responsibility	is	taken	or	allocated	serves	to	remind	us	that	questions	of	who	
and	what	require	some	kind	of	grounding	in	issues	of	capability.	Although	Arctic	Council	
agreements	are	consensual	and	voluntary	in	their	 implementation,	SAR	does	not	come	
with	a	particular	moral	guidance	regarding	 the	governance	of	 the	space	 it	 covers.	The	
agreement	legitimises	the	building	of	infrastructure,	but	there	is	no	guarantee	that	it	will	
not	be	used	for	purposes	other	than	those	which	are	currently	foreseen.	
In	addition,	there	is	the	normative	concern	which	addresses	the	quality	of	the	link	
between	 subject	 and	 object	 of	 responsibility.	 The	 ethics	 underpinning	 policies	 of	
responsibility	matter	profoundly,	not	least	because	the	capacity	of	an	actor	rarely	comes	
with	an	inbuilt	sense	of	direction.	As	the	examples	of	MDA	and	sustainable	development	
have	both	shown,	there	may	be	a	dilemma	in	responsibility	politics	that	emanates	from	a	
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pull	 in	 different	 directions	 by	 several	 responsibility	 linkages	 that	 have	 to	 be	 handled	
simultaneously.	What	can	be	done	to	disentangle	this	web	of	responsibility,	though,	is	a	
matter	for	another	article.	
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